

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 22, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: H. Waugh and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 22, 2000

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh and W. White were on site all week.

W76 Disassembly and Inspection: The AAO manager issued a letter to MHC on Wednesday granting a delay until September 27, 2000 to start up W76 disassembly and inspection operations. The delay was granted to give MHC time 'to identify and implement compensatory measures to establish a stand off distance between the bare CSA . . . and other fuel packages in the operation.'^[II.A]

W80 Command Disablement: The W80 command disablement test remains on hold.^[II.A]

W88 Contractor Readiness Assessment: The contractor readiness assessment for the W88 new authorization basis implementation began on Wednesday. Several items of interest were discussed during the contractor in-brief:

- W88 procedures have not been formatted in the SS-21 format. The procedures are also in an annotated form, with changes attached as technical procedure change requests,
- The scope of the contractor readiness assessment will be limited to elements directly impacted by the new authorization basis and any new tooling,
- The contractor readiness assessment report is scheduled for completion on October 16,
- Start up of W88 operations is projected for January 2001.

The W88 program is proceeding under the assumption that stand-off distances can be relaxed from those imposed on the W76 program due to the connection of an ultraviolet-activated deluge fire suppression system. The W88 contractor readiness assessment will not review this fire suppression system. Instead, a separate readiness assessment will be conducted in early October.^[II.A]

W78 Tooling Calibration: An occurrence report was issued for W78 operations when a production technician identified a piece of tooling in the calibration program that was not calibrated. As written, the occurrence report concludes that the piece of tooling did not actually need to be calibrated (only inspected). The initial notification report did not address the more significant issue: how did this tool, identified in both the W78 procedures and in the calibration recall system as requiring calibration, get into production use for the W78. The site representatives will follow this issue closely to determine whether MHC and DOE identify appropriate corrective actions to review the overall program for tracking the calibration dates of tooling, testers, and other equipment.^[II.A]

12-44 Cell 1: A recent edict that classified B28 case parts stored in Zone 11 must be stored in Zone 12 has resulted in preparations for storage of the B28 cases in Building 12-44, Cell 1. This cell has been closed since 1989, when an accident released tritium into the cell. Required safety evaluations are ongoing and must be completed in time to allow the parts to be transferred to Zone 12 by the end of September.^[II.A]